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Abstract 
This paper will focus on the political implications for the language 
sciences of Sebeok’s move from linguistics to a global semiotic 
perspective, a move that ultimately resulted in biosemiotics. The paper 
will seek to make more explicit the political bearing of a biosemiotic 
perspective in the language sciences and the human sciences in general. 
In particular, it will discuss the definition of language inherent in 
Sebeok’s project and the fundamental re-drawing of the grounds of 
linguistic debate heralded by Sebeok’s embrace of the concept of 
modelling. Thus far, the political co-ordinates of the biosemiotic 
project have not really been made explicit. This paper will therefore 
seek to outline 
1. how biosemiotics enables us to reconfigure our understanding of the 
role of language in culture; 
2. how exaptation is central to the evolution of language and 
communication, rather than adaptation; 
3. how communication is the key issue in biosphere, rather than 
language, not just because communication includes language but 
because the language sciences often refer to language as if it were mere 
“chatter”, “tropes” and “figures of speech”; 
4. how biosemiotics, despite its seeming “neutrality” arising from its 
transdisciplinarity, is thoroughly political; 
5. how the failure to see the implications of the move from linguistics 
to semiotics arises from the fact that biosemiotics is devoid of old style 
politics, which is based on representation (devoid of experience) and 
“construction of [everything] in discourse” (which is grounded in 
linguistics, not communication study). 
In contrast to the post-“linguistic turn” idea that the world is 
“constructed in discourse”, we will argue that biosemiotics entails a 
reconfiguration of the polis and, in particular, offers the chance to 
completely reconceptualise ideology. 
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1. The role of language in culture 
  
Although Thomas A. Sebeok played a central role in propelling 
international study of communication in the 1950s, his career 
before his sojourn studying animal communication at Stanford was 
focused mainly on linguistics and the ethnographic study of 
language[1]. His study of language (singular) as a general 
phenomenon was based on solid fieldwork in immense quantity on 
languages (plural). Sebeok repeatedly defined himself as “a 
biologist manqué”[2] and even suggests that he “became a 
professional linguist and, alas forever, a geneticist manqué”[3]. 
Perspectives on Zoosemiotics, the book which collects the post-
1964 watershed works on animal communication is dedicated to 
the geneticist who taught Sebeok at Chicago, Joseph J. Schwab. 
However, the figure who haunts its earlier pages is Roman 
Jakobson, Sebeok’s one-time mentor who bequeathed the idea of 
“distinctive features” as “universal building blocks of 
language”[4]. Sebeok, at this stage in his career, clearly considered 
distinctive features the “most concretely and substantively 
realized”[5] part of general linguistic theory. In this way, then, 
Sebeok’s thinking on linguistics followed the orthodoxy of the 
time, in thrall to the “language myth”[6] in which linguistic 
communication is seen to be embodied in basic coded elements 
quasi-independent of human interaction[7]. Yet, even in the post-
1964 essays re-printed in Perspectives he notes that the 
“phylogeny of distinctive features […] has clearly not yet 
progressed beyond mere speculation”[8], thus opening biosemiotic 
questions even while engaging in the customary closure of 
communicational questions characteristic of that period in 
institutional linguistics. 
Ultimately, Sebeok’s project was to lead to the fundamental 
re-drawing of the grounds of linguistics through his embrace of the 
concept of modelling. A small part of this project was inspired by 
the Chomskyan revolution in language study from mid-century. 
Yet while this revolution morphed into a further variant of the 
“language myth”, particularly in its spawning of cognitivism[9], 
Sebeok embedded language in the much broader frame of 
semiotics, revealing language to be a modelling process whose 
origins and ramifications were to be found far beyond the utilizing 
of coded elements. That modelling was central to Sebeok’s 
semiotics after his rediscovery of Jakob von Uexküll in the mid-
1970s and that this effectively forged the field of biosemiotics is 
well known. What is less discussed but will be considered in what 
follows is the massive political shift that this development 
heralded. 
  
2. Communication as adaptation vs. language as exaptation 
  
But firstly, let us consider what Sebeok’s notion of modelling 
entails. Taking his cue from the Tartu-Moscow notion of 
modelling system, and Juri Lotman’s model of the semiosphere, 
Sebeok proposed a reconfiguration[10] of the “Primary Modelling 
System” that can be argued to constitute a core distinctive 
paradigmatic feature of biosemiotics. In reconfiguring the pre-
existing notion of modelling system Sebeok suggested that (what 
was once called) “Soviet semiotics”[11] did not sufficiently take 
into account how humans could communicate and build “cultures” 
well before mastering externalised verbal signs. Primary 
modelling, evident in humans since Homo habilis circa three 
million years ago, preceded and is the basis of the verbal encoding 
and decoding that developed with Homo sapiens (around 300,000 
years ago). In the previous millennia communication had been 
carried out among humans by exclusively nonverbal 
communication; verbal communication, speech and writing – 
syntax-based linear communication or externalised verbal 
communication – were exapted[12] as opposed to adapted. Human 
modelling as such is unique among animals because it features 
both nonverbal and verbal communication[13] or, as Terrence W. 
Deacon[14] puts it, we are “apes plus language”. Early humans’ 
possession of a mute verbal modelling device featuring a basic 
capacity for syntax allowed humans to assemble standardised tools 
but circumstances had not yet arisen whereby it was expeditious or 
hominids were in agreement to encode communication in articulate 
linear speech[15]. Thus, for Sebeok, there are sign systems 
(nonverbal communication) which in terms of evolution are 
antecedent to, and give rise to, externalised linguistic sign systems. 
Nonverbal communication is recognised by Sebeok as an adaptive 
communicational capacity possessed by all living beings[16]. It is, 
in fact, only hominids across the whole animal kingdom that 
possess two mutually sustaining repertoires of signs: the 
zoosemiotic nonverbal and the anthroposemiotic verbal[17]. 
The perspectives of the erstwhile “Soviet Semiotics”, which 
put verbal language at the basis of all communications and of the 
organisation of culture, was at risk of both glottocentrism and 
anthropomorphism. In light of the recognition that there is 
communication prior to verbal language, Sebeok recast Tartu-
Moscow notion of modelling systems and observed that (verbal 
language) “is the modelling system the Soviet scholars call 
primary but which, in truth, is phylogenetically as well as 
ontogenetically secondary to the nonverbal”[18]. Thus, according 
to Sebeok, “natural language” or the primary modelling system is 
not verbal language, but is a cognitive capacity manifested in 
“nonverbal communication” through chemical, thermal, olfactory, 
acoustic and visual means. In humans, such primary modelling 
existed, phylogenetically, alongside the cognitive capacity 
manifested in the production of externalised verbal signs 
(secondary modelling system). However, it was not until Homo 
sapiens that such signs (secondary modelling systems) were 
routinely circulated. 
To grasp this point, it is necessary to move back further, as 
Sebeok does, beyond the period of “Soviet semiotics”, to the work 
of the theoretical biologist, J. von Uexküll. Signs, as well as what 
makes up signs, constitute what Uexküll[19] has called an Umwelt. 
The theory of Umwelt posits that all species live in a “world” that 
is constructed out of their own signs, the latter being the result of 
their own sign-making and receiving capacities. A fly, for 
example, has a much different sensory apparatus for 
making / receiving signs than does the human. Beyond those 
capacities of semiosis (sign action) there is a world, the “real” one, 
in a sense, which cannot be reached. Yet, while it is true that 
within a species’ Umwelt there are all manner of possibilities of 
illusion – through misinterpretation of signs, through overlooking 
of signs and through signs not being 100% adequate 
representations of reality – the testimony that an Umwelt is a fairly 
good guide to reality is offered by the survival of the species 
within a given Umwelt. Semiotics is the study of comparative 
Umwelten[20] and, as such, must be concerned with animal and 
plant communication whilst principally attending to the human 
Umwelt which is characterised by what Sebeok called “language” 
– not linguistic communication but the innate and phylogenetically 
developed “modelling” device mentioned above. 
It is in this that Sebeok develops what is probably the core 
proposition of biosemiotics: that the primordial and overarching 
form of communication is nonverbal[21]. Nonverbal 
communication characterizes all life, including a large part of 
human life. Although humans also utilize verbal communication, 
nonverbal communication is implicitly overlooked in many realms 
of human endeavour. In fact, as we signalled above, Sebeok holds 
that natural language “evolved as an adaptation; whereas speech 
developed out of language as a derivative exaptation”[22]. That is, 
while the primary modelling system (refigured by Sebeok), 
sustaining nonverbal communication and driven by the increased 
brain size and differentiation capacity had a palpable survival 
function, the development of the secondary modelling system was 
not a necessary survival mechanism. Primary modelling, argued 
Sebeok, “has been built by selection for the cognitive function of 
modelling and, as the philosopher Popper and the linguist 
Chomsky have likewise insisted, not at all for the message-
swapping function of communication”[23]. Hypothetically, 
hominids might have continued communication by nonverbal 
means for many more millennia; yet they began to utilize their 
capacity for differentiation along with their evolved vocal 
apparatus to produce verbal communication, little knowing that the 
much later developments of speech and cheirography would 
generate oral narratives forging communities and written scripts 
facilitating agriculture and economics. 
Exaptation, here and also as Stephen J. Gould and Elisabeth 
S. Vrba discussed it, demonstrates that one should not assume that 
the current utility of a biological phenomenon is a result of natural 
selection. An exaptation may be desirable and potentially an 
enhancement of the capacity for survival; but that does not 
necessarily entail that it is indispensable for survival, nor that the 
phenomenon in question is the product of natural selection. As 
Davide Weible shows[24], exaptation has become a useful term for 
scholars in biosemiotics. Yet, what exaptation demonstrates most 
strikingly in respect of human evolution is that the phenomenon 
often central to definitions of humanity – language – is, in the 
verbal forms that have provided the foundation for communication 
and culture, only beneficial in evolutionary terms at one remove or 
more, or even, perhaps, in various cases, not beneficial at all. The 
communicational forms that are often taken for granted in the 
human Umwelt and, sometimes, have been assumed to be the only 
portal through which humans can grasp life, are, in this account, 
merely the veneer of anthroposemiosis. 
  
3. Transdisciplinarity as apparent “neutrality” 
  
Moving the focus on semiosis from the level of signs circulating in 
the polis to those circulating in comparative Umwelten in the way 
that we propose might be seen as a gesture towards the apolitical, a 
gesture that is ultimately reactionary since it is a denial of the 
politicization of signs. Yet nothing could be further from the truth. 
Contemporary semiotics, in its transdisciplinarity, has no 
pretentions to “neutrality”. 
A lesson is offered from history. In addition to his work in 
cybernetics and communication theory during the 1950s, as well as 
his inauguration of semiotics for the present era beginning with his 
editing of the Approaches to Semiotics volume in 1964, Sebeok 
also disseminated the transdisciplinary approach that was 
characteristic of Tartu-Moscow semiotics as a whole[25]. 
However, the Tartu-Moscow School was grounded in the 
interdisciplinary developments of 1950s and 60s Soviet academia 
which were, in turn, influenced by cybernetics; thus, it seems that 
biosemiotics, in building on Tartu-Moscow semiotics’ 
transdisciplinarity, automatically inherits cybernetics’ 
transdisciplinarity[26]. Historically, transdisciplinarity did become 
putatively aligned with “neutrality”. Maxim Waldstein claims that 
due to its closeness to mathematical sciences, cybernetics appealed 
to Soviet scholars as an “ideology-free” and thus neutral language. 
This is because cybernetics was believed to aid the clear 
formulation of problems and thus could have favoured the 
reception and expansion of structural linguistics. Arguably then, 
cybernetics was being “marketed” as the “maths of the 
humanities”, particularly in light of it being underwritten, as 
previously shown, by instances of mathematical modelling. For 
example, such a “rhetoric of exactness” is found in Warren 
McCulloch and Walter Pitts’ theory of formal neural networks 
which postulates that “any functioning [of a system] which can be 
defined in its entirety logically, strictly and unambiguously in a 
finite number of words, can also be realised by such formal neural 
networks”[27]; that is, anything that can be put into a question with 
words can be solved. As Waldstein contends, this impetus towards 
exactness and the “ideological neutrality” that is indigenous to 
cybernetics constituted a point of appeal for the semiotics 
developed during Soviet times in that it promised to be “a recipe 
for transformation of linguistics and other human sciences into 
‘true sciences’”[28]. This is because such a promise was directly in 
opposition to Stalinist thinking which impeded scientific 
discovery. As Laurent Schwartz usefully illustrates: “In physics 
[…] such fields as quantum physics were sometimes condemned as 
anti-Marxist, and in biology all progress was rendered practically 
impossible for twenty-five years because of Lysenko”[29], who 
was a member of the USSR academy of sciences who championed 
the non-Darwinian theory that within species there is no 
overpopulation nor struggle for survival. He affirmed that a 
progressive biological science would be indebted not to Darwin 
but to Lenin and Stalin[30]. On the other hand, “under Stalin, 
mathematics was probably more secure than other branches of 
science, doubtless because it is less accessible”[31]. Hence, the 
reason why academics in the humanities fixated on mathematical 
models: they were representative of theory that was not accessible 
to the majority, even intellectually. In fact, in 1964 the term 
secondary modelling system (notably, modelling is a mathematical 
term) was used as an euphemism for semiotics because the very 
term semiotics became quasi-prohibited by scientific state 
officials[32]. 
In other words, one may argue that the early “alliance” of 
Soviet academia with cybernetics can be seen as the beginning of a 
process of de-Stalinisation of knowledge, which is the core of what 
was later dubbed Eurocommunism, or “the vast process of change 
involving the left everywhere in the world – that of de-
Stalinisation”[33]. In fact, as Carl Boggs and David Plotke argue, 
Eurocommunism presents itself as a political formation that sets 
out to transcend the failures of the past through, amongst other 
things, involvement in political struggles that take place within 
institutions and a principled support of social and political 
pluralism[34] much like that which “Soviet” academics were 
trying to achieve. Additionally, Massimo L. Salvadori[35] argues 
that the core basis of Western European Communist parties (the 
Eurocommunists) was a desire for autonomy from the [Stalinist] 
USSR and the adhesion to principles of democracy. Hence one 
may argue that Soviet academia’s desire for autonomy and its 
pursuit of “scientific neutrality” through mathematical models 
could be seen as a precedent for Eurocommunism, or its historical 
context. 
Yet, of course, one can see how such a “neutral” view was an 
ideological – in this case, anti-Stalinist – position in itself. Hence, 
as a prefigurement of neutrality and transdisciplinary applicability 
that was in itself fundamentally political, cybernetics is said to 
have favoured (in Soviet academia, but arguably also in West-
European countries) the birth of semiotics as a science aimed at the 
study of “any sign system in human society”[36]. The universal 
model of applicability proposed by cybernetics, or its 
transdisciplinary character, was thus assimilated into the “Soviet 
Semiotics” project as illustrated by Daniel Peri Lucid[37]. The 
recognition that cybernetics had a strong influence on the birth of 
Tartu-Moscow semiotics is important because this division of 
semiotics was then co-opted by biosemiotics, through the 
elaboration of Lotman’s work on modelling[38] and 
semiosphere[39]. In this respect, an awareness of Soviet semiotic 
interest in cybernetics constitutes the historical and disciplinary 
basis for understanding, conceiving and relaunching a new 
biosemiotic and transdisciplinary polis, for however contradictory 
this expression might sound. 
The transdisciplinarity of contemporary semiotics after 
Sebeok is a curious phenomenon. It stems, in part, from the acutely 
political attempt to carry out research in a “neutral” frame under a 
repressive regime. Yet, the broadening of semiotics is also a 
political move in a much more general sense. Discovering that 
semiosis is politically charged in the polis is one thing; but 
conveniently forgetting that semiosis occurs and is built on the 
development of signs in realms far beyond the polis is considerably 
more “apolitical” and reactionary than attempting to assume a 
supposedly “neutral” transdisciplinary vantage point. It is the 
equivalent of mapping some of the co-ordinates within the dark 
cupboard under the stairs of a vast mansion and proclaiming 
“We’re now able to know the house”. 
  
4. Old polis: Representation and the construction of [everything] in 
discourse 
  
Biosemiotics’ ranging across the whole of semiosis – animal and 
plant – has been in distinct contrast with the powerful idea, 
developed in the last forty years, that many of the determinants of 
human life are “constructed in discourse”. The “linguistic turn” in 
social thought, inaugurated by Richard Rorty’s 1967 
collection[40], has been influential in areas of knowledge where 
the volume is seldom if ever cited. More important still, perhaps, 
and arguably more nebulous, has been the work of structuralism 
and poststructuralism and their basis in a philosophy of the sign 
derived from Ferdinand de Saussure that is often critiqued but 
infrequently rejected altogether. This has been elaborated upon, 
disseminated through the human sciences in the West and almost 
naturalized in Francophone academia from the 1950s onwards and 
from the late 1960s onwards in the Anglophone world. One subject 
area in which this perspective has held sway is the one in which 
both authors of the current article work: media, communications 
and cultural studies. 
The idea of the world “constructed in discourse” has 
underpinned much of the study of the media which is concerned 
with the key issue of “representation”. Introduced in its 
recognizable form by, among others, Roland Barthes in 
Mythologies[41], representation has occupied a privileged role in 
signification, even in its variant of representation through 
code[42], and generally neglects the pragmatic / subjective aspect 
of sign processes. For example Stuart Hall[43] claims that “the 
meaning is not in the object, person or thing, nor is it in the word… 
The meaning is constructed by the system of representation”. One 
can immediately see that this approach privileges representation 
over other aspects of signification, as if construction of meaning 
excluded emotional, physiological and environmental constraints 
or its actual context of use. Hence one may argue that Hall’s view 
tends to worry about the “text in principle” rather than the “text in 
practice”. Even the tedious ideological debate[44] about the active 
or passive status of readers or media audiences which was 
conceived in the 1980s as a solution to the orthodoxy embedded in 
approaches to representation, misses the point. It ignores the fact 
that representation certainly influences the process of signification 
but it is very far from being the sole player in signification, or the 
only factor responsible for the construction of meaning. 
More redolent, still, of a linguistic perspective, in 
Mythologies[45] Barthes introduces the concept of myth; that is, a 
linguistic epiphenomenon amounting to a collective representation 
of reality which, in his view, is not a reflection of reality itself but 
a reflection of culture. In other words, myths are responsible for 
making “culture” pass as “nature” or for turning “the social, the 
cultural, the ideological, the historical into the ‘natural’”[46]. For 
example, in discussing the myth of the Romans in films, Barthes 
states that “in Mankiewicz’s Julius Caesar, all the characters are 
wearing fringes. Some have them curly, some straggly, some 
tufted, some oily, all of them well combed, and the bald are not 
admitted, although there are plenty in Roman history”[47]. In 
short, Barthes underlines the discrepancy between fiction (Romans 
with a fringe) and reality (Romans who must have suffered hair 
loss and thus no fringe). In “Myth today”, the final theory-based 
essay of Mythologies, Barthes uses Louis Hjelmslev in order to 
turn this amusing but simple observation into a complex linguistic 
argument, invoking different levels of form, substance, plane of 
expression and plane of content in the act of representation. 
Barthes claims that “myth hides nothing and flaunts nothing: 
it distorts; myth is neither a lie nor a confession: it is an 
inflection”[48]. Yet he constantly proposes the idea that the 
representation of reality as elicited by myths is false: “The […] 
sign, the fringe of Roman-ness […] reveals a degraded spectacle, 
which is equally afraid of simple reality and of total artifice. For 
although it is a good thing if a spectacle is created to make the 
world more explicit, it is both reprehensible and deceitful to 
confuse the sign with what is signified”[49]. 
Barthes’ worry is that viewers of Joseph L. Mankiewicz’ s 
movie will inevitably confuse the false Romans (with the fringe) 
with the real Romans (who may have not had the fringe). Through 
the concept of myth, Barthes takes complexity away from 
signification and turns it into a typical formal logic problem in 
which the analyst’s job is to determine the True or False aspect of 
a final proposition (in this case, the cultural proposition elicited in 
representation i.e. that Romans with fringes is a false statement). In 
so doing, Barthes reduces the whole process of signification solely 
to its representational aspect, a view that subsists merely “at the 
surface level” of analysis[50]. This perspective, not just prevalent 
but naturalised in media studies, reduces signification to 
representation. It singularly fails to address the question of why 
audiences / readers / human beings willingly and persistently allow 
themselves to “get fooled” in watching movies that present false 
Romans or characters or settings that are equally fictitious. Nor can 
the question simply be answered by quasi-ethnographic audience 
study. It needs to be addressed by broadening, or even abandoning, 
the current linguistically-based concept of representation. 
It is hardly surprising that the “representational” 
perspective ultimately finds itself in a cul-de-sac. It is glottocentric 
and therefore fails to take account of humans as thoroughly 
semiotic entities within a vast environment of (non-human) 
semiosis. Based on linguistics, it can only posit a very limited 
version of the sign, one which is mired in the vicissitudes of 
linguistic communication, chatter and figures of speech which 
make up the loose, common understanding of “language”. When 
one thinks of the sign in its full complexity – as semiotics does, but 
other fields do not have the time to do adequately – a different 
picture emerges. This fact is exemplified especially in the work of 
the American philosopher, John Deely, whose intellectual lineage 
can be traced back through the work of Sebeok and Uexküll 
through the Catholic thinker, Jacques Maritain, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, and to the Tractatus of Joao Poinsot, Aquinas and, 
ultimately the Stoics and Epicureans. For Deely, following 
Poinsot, signs are a matter of “relation” – not, as the 
representational perspective would have it, some entity standing in 
for some other entity from which it is different. For Poinsot and, 
later, for Peirce, the sign needs to be understood as the entire 
relation of its constituents. What is frequently considered the sign 
– the “relation” between some ground and some terminus – was 
discovered by the Latin thinkers to be false because it excluded the 
very awareness of sign functioning that distinguishes humans from 
other animals. The real relation that constitutes the sign consists of 
ground, terminus and “relation” as a triad. Furthermore, Poinsot 
delineates the functions of signs in relation to objects. As such, the 
relation of representation must differ from that of signification 
simply because an object can represent another and also represent 
itself. A sign is only a sign of something if that something is other 
than the sign[51]. Lastly, Poinsot emphasized that the relation in a 
sign is not so much suprasubjective as contextual: in one set of 
circumstances the relation in a sign could be of the order of ens 
reale (mind independent), in another set it could be of ens rationis 
(mind dependent)[52]. 
“Representation” assumes that human semiosis is mind-
dependent (ens rationis), constantly preventing humans from 
gaining anything other than a tantalising glimpse of the mind-
independent (ens reale) universe. Yet, as Deely is at pains to stress 
in the wake of Poinsot, the sign fluctuates between both forms of 
dependency according to context. One might add that implicit in 
the contextuality of the sign is the sharing of some parts of 
signhood across the world of humans, other animals and plants, the 
variegation of semiosis being so extensive that “representation” 
does not really come close to capturing it. Deely writes, initially 
with reference to St. Thomas, 
  
So the levels of dependency in being are complete, from the 
most tenuous of pure relations to the fullness of the divine 
being, with the twist that, according to Aquinas, the inner 
life of God consists in a community of persons each of 
which is a pure relation, but now relations themselves 
subsisting! It is an astonishing picture, much more 
interesting and intricate, actually, than anything dreamed of 
in modern philosophy, bogged down as it became in the 
technical detail necessary to try to maintain at all costs the 
facade of representations blocking our access to the order 
of ens reale, our development of knowledge of the things-
in-themselves, things in the subjective constitution 
according to which they exist and interact among 
themselves and with our bodies[53]. 
  
Ultimately, Deely[54] concludes that “the social construction of 
reality, no doubt, occurs in the political order” and that “reality” 
“as we experience it is neither purely objective [in the sense of 
things experienced as objects in an Umwelt] nor purely subjective 
nor purely intersubjective, but rather a constantly shifting mixture 
and proportion of all three not at all easy (perhaps not even fully 
possible) to keep complete track of”. As a statement about 
semiosis aligned with the biosemiotic idea of Umwelt, this 
demonstrates how biosemiotics does not really partake of the old 
style of politics based on linguistics and envisaging power in the 
masking of reality with illusion. Rather, it proceeds from humans’ 
suspension in a universe of changing relations, sometimes 
“illusory”, sometimes “real”; sometimes reliable enough to 
preserve members of a species, sometimes not. Such fluctuation 
and change entails that humans are not forever barred from reality, 
as the theory of representation insists; nor are they able to easily 
access the road to reality as adopting the theory of representation 
seems to imply. Rather, humans are charged with the task of 
enacting a semiotic awareness appropriate to the vagaries of 
relation. These changing relations, in the world of humans, have 
often been investigated by theories of ideology. 
  
5. New polis: Ideology as the lived biosemiotic relationship to 
existence 
  
As adumbrated above, Barthes’ concern was with the discovery of 
the power relations hidden in texts through representation; in other 
words, with ideology. The concept was especially taken up in 
media and cultural studies in the wake of Louis Althusser’s 
“Ideology and ideological state apparatuses”[55]. Arguably, 
though, insufficient attention has been paid to some of the 
complexities of signhood in this landmark essay and, consequently, 
approaches in media and cultural studies which advocate the falsity 
of representation[56] fall victim to one problem in Althusser’s 
statements, specifically that “ideology” “represents the imaginary 
relationship of individuals to their real conditions of 
existence”[57]. As Kevin McDonnell and Kevin Robins[58] 
convincingly contend, this aspect of Althusser’s argument is 
vitiated by the idea of falsity implied in ideology: “It reduces 
ideology to mere false consciousness. […] Ideology is no false 
consciousness, because it duplicates a concrete reality, one that 
really does exist, one that imposes itself on the texture of everyday 
life. […] Nor is ideology, in this conception, immaterial, a mere 
epiphenomenon; it is an illusion, but one that is ‘the most 
efficacious reality, the spell that holds the world bewitched’ 
(Adorno)”. 
This statement of the importance of the “imaginary”, with its 
Lacanian overtones, has been seized too readily by many from a 
representational perspective. For example, in media and cultural 
studies John Fiske argues[59] that when confronted with popular 
texts, which are supposedly high in ideological content, one can 
choose whether to produce “a preferred reading according to the 
dominant code”, a “negotiated reading”, or a “radically opposed 
reading”[60]. Clearly, it is important, as Fiske argues, that through 
the act of reading one can rebel against the repression exercised 
through ideology by (what Althusser calls) the ideological state 
apparatuses, in the very fact that readership implies “subjectivity” 
and activity (rather than passivity). Yet, the choices offered are 
rather too mechanical: very ideological, quite ideological, anti-
ideological. It is easy to see why the renewed idea of “ideology as 
false consciousness” was readily taken up in media studies with 
Althusser as a cover – it provided the means to theorise a heroic 
reader who was not only capable of “resisting” or opposing 
ideologies (like Barthes’ reader) but was also totally in control of 
his cognitive capacities and was free to choose whether to accept 
or resist ideological propositions. 
However, a more careful reading of Althusser’s essay, 
reveals a fact that rather undermines this position: that is, that the 
subjectivity implied in readership, does not exist prior to ideology, 
but is constituted by it. Famously, Althusser explains this point by 
positing a hypothetical situation in which, a policeman 
(representing the ideological state apparatus) shouts at a passer-by: 
“You, for whom I have shed this drop of my blood” / “Hey, you 
there!” The passer-by is then compelled to pay attention to, and 
reply, upon turning around: “Yes, it’s me!” This vignette illustrates 
how the ideological state apparatus (the policeman) constitutes the 
subject, the individual whose identity (it’s me! – self-recognition) 
has emerged at the same time in which the ideological act (the 
shout) was perpetrated. Impinging on the same example, Fiske 
argued – possibly following Michel Pêcheux[61] – that one can 
“resist” ideology in that “if you hear in the street a shout ‘Hey 
You!’, you can either turn in the belief that you are being 
addressed or you can ignore it… you thus reject the relationship 
implicit in the call”[62]. However, conceiving the reader as a form 
of active audience that is active by the very means of being capable 
of resisting ideology is a view flawed from the start, because it 
presupposes that the subject exists and is as such (i.e. an “active” 
reader) before its encounter with ideology. This is a contradiction, 
despite its pretention to be an exploitation of an Althusserian 
loophole. In Althusserian terms, ideology cannot be resisted in that 
it is constitutive. That is, there is no such thing as an “I” before the 
very call “You”, a perspective which is fully semiotic (subjectivity 
emerges out of relations of meaning) and that puts a heavy burden 
on the workings of “culture”, “nurture” and “ideology” to sustain 
selfhood. 
Neglecting this fact amounts to a desire to take the most 
“convenient” aspect of Althusser’s Marxism (that authorities are 
repressive – the convenient aspect of this statement serving as a 
rationale for “response”, including “reader response”), and 
neglecting the less convenient, that is, that the human being’s 
subjectivity is not as unconstrained as such approaches would like 
to think. In contemporary semiotic terms, humans do not pre-exist 
semiosis and then struggle when they are somehow “inserted” into 
it. Nor are humans the conscious creators of semioses by which 
they can exercise control and power. In an Umwelt, as has been 
noted, humans inhabit from the start the very signs that their 
sensorium allows them to promulgate. Humans cannot “get 
outside” semiosis and control it; along with other living creatures, 
they are semiosis. This corresponds with the other plank of 
Althusser’s work on ideology: concrete reality as a lived relation. 
For Althusser[63], the imaginary and the lived are in a complex 
interplay: ideology 
  
is a matter of the lived relation between men [sic] and their 
world. This relation, that only appears as “conscious” on 
condition that it is unconscious, in the same way only 
seems to be simple on condition that it is complex, that it is 
not a simple relation but a relation between relations, a 
second degree relation. In ideology men do indeed express, 
not the relation between them and their conditions of 
existence, but the way they live the relation between them 
and their conditions of existence: this presupposes both a 
real relation and an “imaginary”, “lived” relation. Ideology, 
then, is the expression of the relation between men and 
their “world”, that is, the (overdetermined) unity of the real 
relation and the imaginary relation between them and their 
real conditions of existence. In ideology the real relation is 
inevitably invested in the imaginary relation, a relation that 
expresses a will (conservative, conformist, reformist or 
revolutionary), a hope or a nostalgia, rather than describing 
a reality. 
  
In this formulation there is an indication of the consonance of 
Althusser’s conception of ideology with the insistence of 
contemporary semiotics on the sign as always relation, but a 
relation oscillating between mind-dependent reality and mind-
independent reality. Ultimately, Althusser’s “imaginary”, an idea 
that sustains the representational perspective, indicates a falling 
back on extraneous and confused speculations from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in the hope that it will shore up a theory of 
subjectivity that will then complement the theory of ideology. 
Clearly, Althusser’s insight into ideology as both “lived” and a 
“relation” was groundbreaking, more so than the representational 
paradigm which grew out of the “imaginary” view of ideology; but 
a more consistent approach would focus on ideology, its 
instruments and its effects, in terms of that which constitutes them: 
human semiosis. 
This bears upon the issue of representation and resistance. 
Ideology, like “information” cannot be “resisted” because it is not 
something that is transferred or forced upon humans; it is instead 
the relation of meaning that emerges when humans interact with 
real objects in a cultural, physiological and environmental context. 
These three contextual levels, and not just the cultural-linguistic 
one, all play a part in framing the way in which ideology is 
constituted. Ideology frequently showcases untruths, to be sure; 
but, from a semiotic standpoint, it is no more “false” than shouting 
out or laughing uncontrollably are “false”. The “linguistic turn”, 
along with the representational paradigm, has fostered the 
seemingly ineluctable impression that, for humans, ideology 
supervenes on a realm of mendacity and a realm of reality. Upheld 
by “language” as a representational medium, the realm of 
mendacity suffuses the polis, holding it in a firm grip which 
refracts all perception and only very occasionally gets broken in 
such a way that it allows humans to glimpse the real – i.e. social – 
relations that obtain within the polis alone. In semiotics, 
particularly after biosemiotics, humans inhabit a synthesis of their 
sensoria and their cognition, constantly negotiating mind-
dependent and mind-independent relations. 
Relying on linguistics as the basis of an understanding of 
how semiosis occurs, as well as for an assessment of sociality and 
what to do with problems that arise from sociality, not only 
occludes humans’ consanguinity with non-human inhabitants of 
this planet but also fails to address the complex edifice of human 
communication. Biosemiotics has had this edifice in its sights since 
being founded by Sebeok. Biosemiotics has sought to proceed, in a 
transdisciplinary mode, from a concept of semiosis as “global” and 
with its own contextual effectivities sustaining Umwelten, rather 
than assuming that signification can be graded according to 
measures of truth and falsity derived from cultural taxonomies. In 
short, biosemiotics’ reconfiguration of the polis consists of having 
bigger fish to fry than traditional political approaches that signal 
the tyrannies of language and pursue the representational 
paradigm. This is not a matter of biosemiotics simply drawing 
back and stating that local political struggles are somehow less 
significant than the bigger picture, as some advocates of 
environmental politics have done. Rather, it is a global view 
recognizing that every semiosis, local and quotidian, is subject to 
relation and is therefore the object of politics. Central to the 
representational view and, for Deely[64], the key impediment of 
modern thought, is the inability to arrive at a coherent distinction 
between mind-dependent and mind-independent being. Relations 
create a public sphere in which there is room for freedom, but there 
is also the possibility of reaching an understanding of nature, 
likewise through relations. The task for science and philosophy, 
then, is to sort out what belongs to the mind and what belongs to 
nature[65], an advanced act of modelling that falls to the human 
alone. Sebeok espoused through biosemiotics a new semiotics 
driven by the idea of modelling; whether he contemplated, in the 
terms outlined above, that he was inaugurating a radically new 
understanding of the polis, is not known. What is clear, however, is 
that the transdisciplinary project of biosemiotics heralds an 
opportunity to completely recapitulate politics, avoiding, this time, 
the blinkered representational stalemate borne of linguistic 
approaches’ parochialism. 
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